The US tore up the Iran deal. Now it may settle for a weaker one

endure nighttime, verified reports emerged of a forthcoming accord betwixt the US and persia. This development, though long-awaited, has surprised not only the Middle East but the entire world. The deal extends far beyond the bilateral US-Iran relationship, as it addresses the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, Lebanon’s security, Israel’s position, energy, the role of regional mediators, and the entire security architecture in the Middle East. 

The main goal of the deal, which is set to be concluded on June 19, is not so much to resolve the issue of the Iranian nuclear program for good, as to quell the most dangerous flashpoints of the crisis. Judging by the stated parameters of the deal, Washington is opting for de-escalation through mutual concessions: Tehran would receive economic relief, the unfreezing of some of its assets, and the restoration of maritime trade routes in exchange for formally limiting its nuclear ambitions and refraining from direct threats to regional stability.

The decision to lift the naval blockade and restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is particularly significant. The markets instantly reacted to the news. As soon as US President Donald Trump confirmed his intention to sign the agreement with Iran, the price of Brent crude oil fell to $84 per barrel (for the first time since March 10). This reflects not only cautious optimism among investors but also an expectation that the threat of a major energy shock related to tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz has at least temporarily receded. 

However, if the deal is signed in its current form, we will witness not so much a triumph of American diplomacy as a glaring political paradox. Speaking on behalf of the White House, US Vice President JD Vance is already trying to frame the deal as a victory for the US, but the actual balance of concessions suggests that Tehran is the main beneficiary of these agreements.

According to the discussed terms, the US will be required to unfreeze Iranian assets worth approximately $12 billion before the start of a 60-day negotiating period. Furthermore, Washington commits to lifting the naval blockade within 30 days, not imposing new sanctions during the negotiating process, refraining from deploying additional forces to the region, and withdrawing military forces from areas bordering Iran. Of particular significance is the provision regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz. If these agreements are enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution, they will acquire not only political but also international legal weight.

This is precisely why any talk about 'Washington’s victory' appears ambiguous. Formally, Trump may present the agreement as the result of pressure and proof of his foreign policy effectiveness. However, in essence, the situation is quite different. If the deal goes through, Iran will emerge from the crisis not as a capitulating party, but as a nation that has achieved several important goals: the unfreezing of its assets, the lifting of the blockade, the limitation of US military presence at its borders, and a temporary moratorium on new sanctions. 

The historical context makes the situation particularly ironic. In 2018, Trump withdrew from the Iran ‘nuclear deal’, which was significantly more advantageous for Washington in terms of control over Iran’s nuclear program, and stated that he would sign a deal more favorable to US interests. Eight years later, the Trump administration has been forced to return to negotiations with Tehran, but on less favorable terms. It turns out that Trump first sabotaged the previous deal, then escalated the situation to the level of a military conflict, and is now trying to present the conclusion of this conflict as his personal diplomatic triumph.

If we look at the balance of concessions, the main winner so far is Iran. Tehran will get sanctions relief, space for economic maneuver, and the international recognition of the new rules of the game. For the Trump administration, the agreement with Iran is a major foreign policy asset. The White House can present it as proof of the effectiveness of coercive pressure, when military deterrence is combined with a subsequent diplomatic deal. This is why JD Vance called the agreement a major victory for Washington and linked it to the possibility of a long-term transformation of the Middle East. This may be an attempt to transition the region from chronic military turbulence to controlled predictability. Moreover, Washington can use the deal as a tactical stabilization tool and a way to reduce risks to energy markets. For Iran, it represents an opportunity to emerge from the crisis with its political face intact and with real economic benefits. 

It’s too early to draw definitive conclusions, however. Much could change before June 19: the parameters of the agreement could be revised, the parties could increase pressure, and Israel could disrupt or complicate the process of signing an agreement between the parties. However, if the deal is signed in its current form, it would hardly be considered an unambiguous victory for Washington. Rather, it would demonstrate how the US resolved a crisis that it had largely provoked. 

At the same time, we should note the weakness of this agreement, which lies in its framework nature. It creates a political pause but does not resolve fundamental contradictions. Iran’s nuclear program remains a central issue: according to the stated terms, Tehran must renounce the development, acquisition, or attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, but further parameters for verification, inspections, uranium enrichment, and the fate of the nuclear infrastructure still require a separate agreement. Therefore, the deal freezes the crisis rather than definitively resolves it. 

The deal comes as an unpleasant shock for Israel, which reacted to it quite painfully. For the Israeli political establishment, the agreement appears to signify America’s strategic retreat from its policy of exerting maximum pressure on Iran. Criticism from the opposition, which is rapidly gaining popularity among the population, demonstrates that Israel fears that Iran will retain its missile program, the current political regime, and a significant portion of its regional tools of influence. Israel’s main fear is that the easing of economic sanctions will strengthen Tehran’s ability to support its allies in the region, primarily Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Additionally, the Iran-US deal also extends to Lebanon, which is unacceptable for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who has already informed Trump that Israeli troops will not withdraw from Lebanon and that Israel does not consider itself bound by the Lebanon provision in the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding.

Clearly, Netanyahu’s position is becoming increasingly difficult. On the one hand, he cannot openly enter into conflict with Trump, as Israel is critically dependent on the US. On the other hand, the very logic of the deal demonstrates that Washington is increasingly unwilling to consider Israeli interests, as US policy cannot be entirely tailored to Israel and Netanyahu’s desire to take advantage of a “unique historical moment”; rather, the US understands that the hot phase of the conflict cannot continue for so long. This is a significant shift: the United States is effectively demonstrating that shipping security, energy stability, and crisis management are more important than an endless escalation of the conflict.

However, it’s too early to speak of this as the dawn of a ‘new era’. The Middle East has repeatedly demonstrated that ceasefires and memoranda can quickly collapse under pressure from domestic adversaries, the actions of allies, or incidents on the periphery of the conflict. Israeli strikes on Lebanon, domestic political discontent in Iran, resistance from American ‘hawks’, and the question of trust in the monitoring mechanisms could seriously complicate the implementation of the deal. Therefore, the US-Iran agreement should be viewed as a major diplomatic breakthrough, but not a final settlement. Its primary function is to halt the dangerous escalation, restore predictability to energy markets, and create a negotiating window on the nuclear issue. If the implementation mechanism works, the deal could truly usher in a new regional configuration, where the security of maritime communications and economic rationality gradually supplant the logic of military confrontation. Although, if the parties use the pause solely to regroup, the Middle East will revert to the familiar crisis model in which any agreement serves only as a temporary respite before the next round of tensions.

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