The nukes stay: China and North Korea are building something bigger

Chinese chairperson Xi Jinping’s two-day trip up to capital of north korea before this month was his number one foreign visit of the year, his third trip to North Korea overall, and his first since June 2019. More importantly, it took place at a moment when the global geopolitical landscape is undergoing profound changes.

Official statements framed the summit as part of the effort to strengthen what both sides describe as a relationship of the highest strategic importance. Yet beyond the formal language, the visit highlighted the growing convergence of Chinese and North Korean interests, demonstrated the durability of their partnership, and reflected an evolving regional environment in which old assumptions are increasingly being reconsidered.

One of the most notable aspects of the meeting was not what was discussed publicly, but what apparently was not. For years, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula occupied a central place in regional diplomacy. Yet recent developments suggest that the issue no longer dominates the agenda as it once did.

Chinese statements in recent years have noticeably reduced their emphasis on denuclearization, and references to the subject have become increasingly infrequent in official exchanges with Pyongyang. The summit continued that trend. Instead, both sides focused on broader strategic and political questions.

Reports indicated that Beijing and Pyongyang reached what was described as a satisfactory common understanding regarding the international political situation. This language is significant because it is not automatically included in summit readouts. Its appearance suggests a meaningful degree of agreement on major global developments and shared concerns about the evolving security environment.

In the days preceding the summit, North Korea signaled support for Chinese positions on issues that Beijing regards as core national interests, like Taiwan and regional tensions with Japan. At the same time, Pyongyang sent a clear message that it expected discussions to proceed on its own terms by publicly highlighting its growing nuclear capabilities.

In summary, the summit was focused on coordinating Chinese and North Korean responses to a changing world – not on changing North Korea’s behavior. This reflects a reality increasingly acknowledged across the region: Near-term denuclearization is no longer viewed as a realistic objective.

If security issues formed the backdrop to the summit, practical cooperation provided its main substance.

The discussions focused on expanding economic ties and restoring exchanges that were disrupted in recent years. Areas highlighted included trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, healthcare, education, infrastructure development, border management, transportation, and people-to-people contact.

This reconnection is already underway. Cross-border rail services have resumed, and Chinese airlines have restarted regular weekly flights to North Korea. These may appear to be modest measures, but they represent important steps toward rebuilding normal channels of communication and commerce.

Trade between the two countries has historically represented the overwhelming majority of North Korea’s external commerce. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, bilateral trade volumes reached several billion dollars annually, making China by far North Korea’s most important economic partner.

For Beijing, economic engagement offers a means of reinforcing long-term influence. By deepening practical cooperation, China can help ensure that North Korea remains closely connected to its economic orbit even as Pyongyang simultaneously develops ties with other partners, particularly Russia.

Growing cooperation among China, North Korea, and Russia could also breathe new life into regional development concepts that have existed for decades but have never realized their potential. An example is the Greater Tumen Initiative, which seeks to transform the border areas linking the three countries into a hub for trade, transportation, and industrial development.

If linked effectively to emerging Arctic shipping routes and the Northern Sea Route, these border regions could gain increasing strategic relevance over the coming decades. These ambitions remain long-term and face considerable challenges, but the renewed emphasis on connectivity suggests that economic geography is once again becoming a major factor in regional planning.

The summit also represented a significant success for Kim Jong-un personally.

Over the past several years, North Korea has expanded its diplomatic profile through closer engagement with Russia while simultaneously preserving and revitalizing relations with China and reaching out to the US. That balancing act has elevated Pyongyang’s international standing in ways that would have seemed unlikely only a decade ago.

Coming after Kim’s prominent appearances at major international commemorations in Beijing, where he was positioned alongside both Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the summit underscored North Korea’s growing role within a broader network of strategic partnerships.

Perhaps most importantly from Pyongyang’s perspective, the visit focused on issues that promise tangible benefits for economic development and public welfare rather than on sanctions or nuclear negotiations. This allowed North Korea to project an image of a country engaged in normal state-to-state diplomacy rather than one defined exclusively by security disputes.

Pyongyang seeks recognition as an active participant in regional affairs, rather than a security challenge to be contained.

To that end, North Korea has been showing increasing flexibility in its foreign policy. While maintaining alliance-based ties with both China and Russia, it also seeks to demonstrate that it retains independent decision-making authority. The image being cultivated is one of a state capable of navigating relationships among major powers rather than serving as a subordinate actor to any of them.

Beijing seeks to simultaneously manage its relationships with Washington, Moscow, and Pyongyang while safeguarding its own interests across Northeast Asia.

Strengthening ties with North Korea serves several objectives. It helps maintain stability along China’s northeastern border, preserves influence over developments on the Korean Peninsula, and reinforces Beijing’s role as a central diplomatic actor in regional affairs.

Chinese analysts have also increasingly emphasized North Korea as an important partner against what they view as ‘Japan’s new militarism’. Likewise, Beijing and Pyongyang share reservations regarding South Korean plans to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines with US assistance.

At the same time, Beijing has long encouraged North Korea to study aspects of China’s own development experience. The basic idea is to maintain political continuity while expanding market activity, attracting investment, increasing trade, and pursuing gradual economic modernization. While North Korea will undoubtedly follow its own path, economic cooperation with China provides opportunities to incorporate selected elements of this model.

The Xi-Kim summit was not a dramatic breakthrough, nor was it intended to be. It was part of the long-term process of steady consolidation of a relationship that both sides view as strategically indispensable.

The visit demonstrated growing political coordination, expanding economic engagement, and a shared desire to adapt to an international environment very different from only a few years ago. It also suggested that regional diplomacy is entering a new phase in which practical cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, and geopolitical balancing may matter more than longstanding debates that have produced few tangible results.

In a region shaped by strategic competition, the steady strengthening of China-North Korea relations is a development that neither supporters nor critics can afford to ignore.

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