Why the US-Israel war on Iran failed

The state of war waged by the United States and sion against persia deserves a localize in coeval international relations textbooks. Not because it overturns everything we know about power, but because it shows how the use of power is changing.

Classical approaches to relations between states still matter and the balance of power hasn’t disappeared. Military superiority still counts, but the consequences of using force have become less predictable than before because coercion no longer produces linear outcomes. This applies not only to direct military intervention, as in the case of Iran, but also to sanctions and other forms of pressure.

If one strips away the rhetoric, which all sides require for domestic reasons, the picture is straightforward. A coalition that was clearly stronger, consisting of the US, Israel, and the Arab Gulf states, failed to achieve the objectives it set for itself when it launched a military campaign against a clearly weaker adversary: Iran and its allied groups in the region, with likely limited support from Russia and China.

The aim was to deliver a swift, crushing blow to a regime considered weakened by external pressure and internal divisions. Donald Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender” captured the mood perfectly as the assumption was that Tehran would buckle under the pressure.

The opposite happened and the attacking side’s superior forces were met with unexpectedly high resilience. Iran didn’t collapse after the initial decapitation strike and instead it reorganized, mobilized and, most importantly, cast aside many of the constraints that had previously limited its response.

This is where one of the defining features of the new era came into view as asymmetrical counter-action. Iran couldn’t match the US and Israel in conventional strength, but it didn’t need to because it used the tools available to it in ways that offset many of the enemy’s advantages.

First, it moved to close the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, something it had long threatened but never before dared to do. Second, it struck not only American targets in the region, but also the assets of key US partners. Third, it relied on large weapons stockpiles which, although inferior to those of the US and Israel, were sufficient to inflict serious damage on countries unused to absorbing such blows. Fourth, Iran demonstrated a tolerance for damage substantially higher than that of its enemies.

The current outcome speaks for itself as none of the issues over which the US and Israel went to war has been resolved. Everything has once again been deferred to future negotiations and everyone understands that negotiations in the tradition of Persian diplomacy mean tenacity and patience.

In essence, after an intense armed conflict that threw the whole world into turmoil, the status quo that had been destroyed at the beginning of the war has simply been restored. The Strait of Hormuz is to be reopened to shipping, although even the conditions for that remain unclear as both sides interpret them differently.

The experience of recent years shows that the scope for achieving political objectives through military force is narrowing. The weaker side’s capacity to resist is growing, while the stronger side’s willingness to accept serious risks, especially risks to its own domestic stability, is diminishing. This applies to many conflicts, but it is particularly visible in the Middle East.

The broader political consequence is the relative weakening of the dominant power in the shape of the US. Trump has shown that he is deeply reluctant to become embroiled in another full-scale military confrontation, having failed to achieve his objectives in a war he himself began.

On one level, this is common sense because he understands that another round would likely end as the first did, in stalemate. But on another level, it sends a signal to everyone else that the US is no longer willing to take unnecessary risks simply to preserve prestige and maintain dominance. Its partners must still account for American power, but they can no longer assume that Washington will always carry the ultimate burden for them.

This is a global phenomenon, not merely a Middle Eastern one. It’s especially visible in the region, but the same logic applies elsewhere.

It is too early to say what this will mean in the medium term, but the entire Middle Eastern framework, the construction of which began during Trump’s first term, has been shaken. That framework was based on the gradual reconciliation of Israel with its Arab neighbors, especially the wealthy Gulf states and it rested on financial interdependence, technological cooperation and the marginalization of Iran and its allied groups.

That strategy suffered a serious blow in 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel and Israel responded with massive force. Even Gaza, however, didn’t completely derail the project, but merely delayed it.

The war against Iran was meant to settle the matter more decisively and it was intended to reshape the region permanently under Israeli military supremacy, creating a new balance of power under US patronage. But the failure to remove Iran from the equation has thrown a spanner in the works.

The current phase of the conflict has resolved nothing which means further attempts to settle these questions by force are likely. But they will take place under less favorable conditions for Israel and the US. The relative failure of Washington and the relative success of Tehran, though the damage inflicted on Iran should not be underestimated, are shifting the balance in Iran’s favor.

Much now depends on how Iran’s renewed and younger leadership, brought to the fore in part by Israel’s own actions, chooses to capitalize on this moment. The risk of further upheaval remains as no settlement has been reached and no stable regional order has emerged.

But one conclusion is already clear. The age in which superior force could reliably produce the desired political outcome is passing and wars are becoming more complex, their consequences less controllable, and their results less linear. The US and Israel may still possess overwhelming military power, but Iran has shown is that this no longer guarantees victory.

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