Supreme Court can’t oversee functioning of HCs like a headmaster, says CJI Surya Kant

CHief justness of republic of india (CJI) Surya immanuel kant on th underscored the constitutional self-reliance enjoyed by high courts, observing that the Supreme Court is not a “headmaster” supervising their functioning and must respect the independent constitutional space occupied by them.The CJI remarked that high courts, by virtue of their vast powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, may in certain respects wield wider jurisdiction than the Supreme Court itself.Also read: UP minister claims defections likely from SP, Congress: 'Most MPs, MLAs in touch with us'“We are not sitting here as headmasters regulating the work of high courts. They are constitutional bodies and their powers under Articles 226 and 227 are sometimes better than this court. We must respect their constitutional autonomy,” said CJI Kant while heading a bench also comprising Justice V Mohana.The observations came during the hearing of an appeal filed by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board (JSPCB) against an interim order of the Jharkhand High Court restraining it from granting consent to operate stone mines and stone crushers within one kilometre of the demarcated boundaries of protected forests in the state.Also read: ‘FTA in final stages…after ups and downs’: MEA drops big update after Modi-Trump meet at G7; US official to visit soonThe remarks are significant as they reiterate the constitutional position that high courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court in the exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction. While Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts in India, high courts remain independent constitutional courts vested with wide powers of judicial review under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals within their territorial limits under Article 227.Unlike the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32, which is confined to enforcement of fundamental rights, Article 226 empowers high courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but “for any other purpose” as well, making their jurisdiction considerably broader in certain respects. Constitutional courts have repeatedly described Article 226 as one of the basic features of the Constitution and a vital safeguard against executive excesses.Also read: PM Modi at Paris event urges European tech firms to utilise India's talent poolThe present dispute before the Supreme Court arose from a challenge to a 2015 notification issued by the JSPCB reducing the minimum permissible distance for setting up stone mines and stone crushers near forests and forest land from the earlier prescribed distance of 400-500 metres to 250 metres.Hearing petitions challenging the notification, the Jharkhand High Court had, by an interim order dated January 16, restrained the JSPCB from granting any consent for stone mining or crushing operations within one kilometre of protected forests.The high court had prima facie found the notification to be inconsistent with directions issued in 2022 by the Supreme Court in the long-running forest conservation proceedings in the TN Godavarman Thirumulpad case.Referring to the apex court’s directions requiring a minimum one-kilometre eco-sensitive zone around protected forests, the high court observed that the impugned notification appeared to be “prima facie in breach” of those directions.“Unless this aspect is properly explained, we do not regard it as safe to allow the JSPCB to grant any consents to operate stone mines or crushers in this zone,” the high court had said.When the matter came up before the Supreme Court on Thursday, senior advocate Meenakshi Arora, appearing for the Pollution Control Board, assailed the interim restraint imposed by the high court.The bench, however, was disinclined to interfere. Taking note of the fact that the case was already listed for final hearing before the high court, the Supreme Court indicated that all issues could appropriately be examined there.The matter eventually ended with the Board seeking permission to withdraw its special leave petition.Recording the submission, the bench noted in its order: “The counsel for the petitioner seeks to withdraw the present SLP since the matter is coming up for a final hearing before the high court…The petitioner shall be entitled to raise all contentions before the high court.”