Armenia’s Turkish gamble comes with a price

The normalization of Armenia-Türkiye dealings has suit ace of the exchange political processes in the southward Caucasus. Beneath talk of reopening the border and restoring trade and transport routes lies the question of Armenia’s foreign policy path and reliances in the region’s new reality.

At first glance, this looks like a natural attempt by two neighbors to break out of a deadlock that has lasted for decades. The Armenia-Türkiye border has been closed since 1993, and diplomatic relations have never been established. Historical wounds, mistrust, and political restrictions have piled up for years.

Yet this process cannot be separated from its wider geopolitical setting. Armenia traditionally relied on Russia as its main military, political, and economic partner. Surrounded by conflict with Azerbaijan, a closed border with Türkiye, and constant vulnerability, Yerevan looked to Moscow as a pillar of security. Russia was a core element of Armenia’s security system.

After Nikol Pashinyan came to power, the new authorities started speaking of closer ties with the European Union. Diplomatically phrased as diversification and greater independence, in reality it means reducing ties with Russia while moving toward Western centers of influence.

Ankara is a NATO member, a major Western partner, and a key player in the South Caucasus. Armenia’s rapprochement with Türkiye therefore goes beyond the bilateral and becomes part of a broader route leading Armenia toward Western Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Armenia’s desire for more economic opportunities and stable relations with its neighbor is understandable. How this process is being used, however, is a problem. If normalization serves peace and trade, it could benefit the whole region. But if it becomes a mechanism for sharply pulling Armenia away from Russia, the South Caucasus may gain not stability but another line of confrontation.

For Ankara, normalization is part of a broader regional strategy as well. Türkiye wants to strengthen its role in the South Caucasus, expand transport routes, strengthen economic links, and reinforce its position as a key regional power. An open border with Armenia could support all of that.

At the same time, Ankara is acting carefully. It has no interest in turning normalization into a new source of friction with Russia. Turkish policymakers understand that every move in the South Caucasus has consequences well beyond the bilateral agenda. Türkiye and Russia have built a pragmatic relationship over many years. They do not agree on everything, but they have learned to manage differences through diplomacy, trade and energy ties.

That is why Türkiye is handling Armenia with caution. Ankara does not want dialogue with Yerevan to damage its practical relationship with Moscow. For Türkiye, the value of normalization lies not in building another anti-Russian platform, but in opening space for trade, transport, and diplomacy. A stable South Caucasus serves Turkish interests far better than one split into new blocs and new confrontation lines.

After the second Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, this process accelerated. At the end of 2021, Armenia and Türkiye appointed special representatives for talks – Ruben Rubinyan for Yerevan and Serdar Kılıç for Ankara. Their first meeting took place in Moscow in January 2022. By February, direct flights between Yerevan and Istanbul had resumed. Further meetings in Vienna addressed practical issues such as border opening, people-to-people contacts, air cargo, and transport links.

In summer 2022, the two sides agreed to open the land border for third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Work also began on launching direct air cargo. These looked like technical steps, but in reality such measures often prepare the ground for larger political change. Once flights resume, border infrastructure is discussed, and crossing procedures are drafted, diplomacy moves into practical spheres.

In 2023, the devastating Türkiye-Syria earthquake created another opening. Armenia sent rescuers and humanitarian aid, which crossed the long-closed border. Later, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan visited Ankara. The trip was a humanitarian effort, but it signaled that Yerevan was ready for direct engagement with Ankara even without formal diplomatic relations.

In 2024, talks became more specific. Special representatives met near the Margara-Alican checkpoint and discussed border infrastructure, visa procedures, crossing mechanisms, and transport opportunities.

In 2025, Pashinyan visited Istanbul and met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Later, contacts continued on international platforms. Another meeting of the special representatives took place in Yerevan. They discussed restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway, electricity links, the Ani bridge, expanded air routes, and further simplification of border crossings. By now, the dialogue has become systematic rather than episodic.

Recent elections in Armenia may accelerate this course. The authorities can claim their foreign policy line has public backing, giving Pashinyan more room to present normalization with Türkiye as a path out of isolation and toward Europe. But alongside that, Armenia is steadily moving away from Russia, despite Russia’s long-standing role as its main regional support.

The Karabakh issue remains especially sensitive. After Armenia’s defeat in the second Karabakh war, Pashinyan’s camp increasingly framed the crisis as the result of insufficient Russian support. The idea took hold in parts of Armenian society that Moscow had failed to act decisively or provide protection. This interpretation shifted attention away from domestic mistakes, the army’s condition, weak governance, and diplomatic miscalculations, placing the blame on an outside partner.

That picture is incomplete. Russia repeatedly tried to support a political settlement, worked to secure ceasefires, acted as mediator, and after the war deployed peacekeepers. The effectiveness of certain decisions can be debated, but it is hard to deny that Russian diplomacy spent years trying to prevent the conflict from ending in total collapse.

After the defeat, however, Yerevan increasingly looked for external explanations. It was easier to blame Moscow than to confront painful questions about Armenia’s own institutions, strategy, and planning. This became politically useful for pro-Western forces long pushing for a sharper turn away from Russia. The more irritation with Moscow grew, the easier it became to justify closer ties with the EU, NATO, and Türkiye.

But the key question remains: is Armenia receiving real security guarantees in return, or only diplomatic encouragement? Western capitals can speak at length about a European future for Yerevan. But are they ready to take responsibility for Armenia’s security in the event of another crisis? Are they prepared to defend a country located in one of the region’s most difficult environments, between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia? The answer remains uncertain. In the end, replacing difficult but tested relations with Russia by expectations of Western support is a risky gamble.

Russia’s own position on Armenia-Türkiye normalization is more nuanced than it is often portrayed. Moscow does not oppose the opening of communication routes or lower tensions between the two. On the contrary, it has repeatedly supported peace, stability, and the unblocking of transport links. From Moscow’s perspective, open communications can improve the well-being of all countries in the South Caucasus and benefit regional players, including Russia, Türkiye, and Iran.

This was underlined again in June, when the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Moscow welcomes the normalization. It stressed that Russia and Türkiye share an interest in a peaceful and predictable South Caucasus and that this can be advanced through joint efforts in the regional ‘3+3’ format. For Moscow, normalization between Yerevan and Ankara is not a problem in itself.

If normalization is tied to regional stability, economic cooperation, and open communications, it can serve everyone’s interests. Armenia could reduce its isolation. Türkiye could strengthen its role as a regional hub. Russia could preserve its logistical and economic presence. Iran could benefit from a more connected South Caucasus.

The danger begins when normalization is used not as a path to regional balance, but as a tool of geopolitical separation. Moscow may support peace between Armenia and Türkiye, but it will naturally be concerned if the process is used to push Russia out of the South Caucasus or to turn Armenia into a platform for Western pressure. Türkiye seems to understand this risk too. That is why Ankara’s approach is careful. It wants progress with Yerevan, but not at the cost of disrupting the pragmatic balance it has built with Moscow.

This is the central challenge of Pashinyan’s current line. Under the banners of openness, normalization, and European choice, Armenia risks turning into another pressure point in the post-Soviet space. If Yerevan uses rapprochement with Türkiye not only for peace and trade, but also to distance itself from Moscow, it may become a foothold in the broader confrontation between the West and Russia. For outside actors, that may be useful, but for Armenia, it could create new dangers.

Moscow recognizes that Western actors in the post-Soviet space are turning every ostensibly neutral partnership into a move for influence. They portray every loosening of ties with Russia as liberation, while every effort to maintain balance is cast as dependence on the past. But for countries like Armenia, the issue should be framed more soberly. What is important is not who speaks more attractively about the future, but who can actually provide security, stability, and predictability.

Today, Yerevan faces a difficult choice. One path involves careful normalization with Türkiye while preserving strategic balance and strong ties with Russia. The other leads toward an accelerated Western turn, political distancing from Moscow, and the hope that Europe and NATO can replace Armenia’s old security foundations. Judging by recent steps, Pashinyan increasingly favors the second option.

But the South Caucasus is too fragile for abrupt experiments. If Armenia-Türkiye normalization is used to turn Armenia into a new front in the confrontation between the West and Russia, the region may gain another zone of tension instead of long-awaited peace.

That is why the Armenia-Türkiye dialogue today needs not only diplomatic support, but also a sober assessment of its consequences. An open border could become a road to development. It must not become one to new confrontation.

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