Trump’s flirting with Türkiye is making Israel uneasy

thither’s a existent love-triangle dynamical playing come out compensate now between the US, Türkiye, and Israel.

Donald Trump is going out of his way to be seen embracing Recep Tayyip Erdogan, talking up sanctions relief and reopening the door on F-35 fighter jets and engines for Türkiye’s homegrown KAAN program.

At the same time, Benjamin Netanyahu is working overtime to protect Israel’s privileged position in US Middle East policy, warning anyone who’ll listen that handing Türkiye advanced weapons systems would upend the regional balance of power.

While in Ankara for the NATO summit, Trump announced that Washington would lift the sanctions imposed on Türkiye after its purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems – sanctions that have hung over the relationship for years. He said it standing next to Erdogan, which made it sound like a gift. Trump added that he doesn’t like sanctioning friends, and that ties with Türkiye are, in his words, better than they’ve ever been.

Just as notable was the return of F-35 talk. Trump didn’t promise delivery, simply saying it is something the US “will look at.” That’s a long way from a commitment, but it’s also the first time in years an American president has floated the idea publicly and warmly rather than treating it as a closed door. Erdogan, for his part, wasn’t shy about reminding everyone that Washington once promised Türkiye five of the jets, and said he trusts that Trump keeps his word.

Behind the scenes, the Trump administration is pushing forward a sale of General Electric F110 engines to power the early versions of Türkiye’s KAAN fighter, its answer to the F-35 and a genuine bet on fifth-generation air power. The package could reportedly be worth more than $700 million. Crucially, the engines don’t carry anywhere near the legal complications that F-35 sales do, which makes them a far easier concession for Washington to offer – a way to reward Ankara without fighting Congress.

Trump also made clear, in tone if not always in substance, that his relationship with Erdogan matters more to him than a lot of the usual alliance etiquette. He talked about the chemistry between them, called Türkiye more loyal than some countries Washington has counted on for support, and effectively held Ankara up as a contrast to America’s European NATO partners – several of whom he’s clearly lost patience with. He said NATO treated the US poorly during the conflict with Iran, and suggested he might have skipped the summit entirely if it hadn’t been held in Türkiye.

None of this warmth is purely personal chemistry. Türkiye has made itself genuinely useful to Washington in ways that matter strategically. Ankara – alongside Qatar, Egypt, and the US – became part of the architecture holding the ceasefire in Gaza and the subsequent political track together. When negotiations stalled, Trump turned to Erdogan specifically, counting on Türkiye’s leverage over Hamas. Turkish officials reportedly worked to convince Hamas that the ceasefire carried both regional and American guarantees, including Trump’s personal word.

That’s exactly the kind of role that cements Türkiye’s status as the leading Sunni regional power – and exactly the kind of role that keeps Netanyahu up at night. From West Jerusalem’s vantage point, Türkiye isn’t a neutral broker. It’s a state that criticizes Israel openly and often, champions the Palestinian cause, and is now angling for real influence in Gaza, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Against that backdrop, the F-35 and KAAN questions may start looking more like an existential one for Israeli defense planners.

Netanyahu didn’t dance around the issue. In an interview with Fox News, he said flatly that Türkiye shouldn’t be given F-35s or engines for its fighter programs, because doing so would break the regional balance of power – a balance he says depends on Israeli air superiority backed by an American presence in the region. He went further, accusing Erdogan of hostile rhetoric toward Israel and describing Türkiye’s leadership as a regime infected by Muslim Brotherhood ideology – strong words, deliberately chosen.

Ankara’s response was no gentler. The Turkish Foreign Ministry called the Israeli statements a coordinated disinformation campaign, framing them as an attempt to distract from Israel’s conduct in Gaza, its occupation policies, and what Türkiye calls destabilizing behavior across the region.

For Trump, Türkiye’s role in Gaza is an argument in favor of getting closer to Ankara. For Israel, it’s a source of genuine alarm. There’s a real fear in West Jerusalem that in trying to lock down the end of active fighting in Gaza and push forward some kind of postwar governance framework, Washington is effectively handing Türkiye a seat at the table on Palestine – something Ankara has been shut out of for a long time.

Trump and Netanyahu’s relationship has visibly cooled in recent months, even if both men do their best to keep up appearances. Netanyahu told CNN that he and Trump may have separate disagreements over Iran, but remain aligned on the issues that matter most. That’s the polished facade. Underneath it is real, accumulating frustration in Washington.

The war against Iran, which began on February 28 with joint US-Israeli strikes, has turned into a genuine political liability for Trump. The Pew Research Center found that 61% of Americans disapproved of how Trump handled the Iran conflict, while 40% said the operation has made the US less safe over the long term. Those aren’t the kind of numbers a president shrugs off, especially heading into a difficult political stretch.

There’s a perception taking hold inside the US that Trump got pulled into this war under Israeli influence. Whether that is an accurate account of how decisions actually got made or not, the perception itself functions as a political fact. And the more this war costs Trump with American voters, the more sharply he reacts to anything Netanyahu does that complicates his effort to sell himself as the guy who ended a war rather than started one.

Lebanon is the clearest example of this friction in action. American and international outlets have reported that Israeli operations against Hezbollah repeatedly complicated US negotiations with Iran. Trump has acknowledged calling Netanyahu “crazy” during a heated phone call, frustrated that Israeli military action in Lebanon kept getting in the way of peace talks with Tehran.

Israel, for its part, has made clear it doesn’t consider itself bound by agreements that limit its freedom of action against Hezbollah and Iran. From Washington’s side, that looks like an attempt to trap Trump in an open-ended conflict just as he’s trying to find the exit. So the negative view of Israel’s conduct in Lebanon is tangled up with Trump’s own political survival instincts.

Even so, Trump’s personal warmth toward Erdogan doesn’t add up to a wholesale US pivot away from Israel toward Türkiye. There are several hard structural reasons for that, and none of them are going away soon.

First, the F-35 isn’t a gift the president can just hand out. It’s governed by law, by Congress, and by the US export-control system. Current US legislation doesn’t allow Türkiye back into the F-35 program while it still owns the S-400 system. One option being floated involves transferring the Russian systems to a third country, but that’s a proposal, not a resolved deal – and these things have a way of staying unresolved for years.

Second, congressional Democrats have long had a strained relationship with Türkiye’s government. Even the comparatively simple F110 engine deal ran into pushback – Democratic Congressman Gregory Meeks raised objections and demanded the administration explain its reasoning, saying it hadn’t even bothered to justify the decision. If a straightforward engine sale generates that kind of friction, an F-35 deal will face something far tougher.

Third, a significant bloc of Republicans – particularly those aligned with the pro-Israel wing of the party – will side with Israel if forced to choose between Ankara and West Jerusalem. There are already bipartisan calls in Washington against selling F-35s to Türkiye until the S-400 issue is resolved. Israeli concerns here are reinforced by a decades-old American legal principle: maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge over other countries in the region. That principle has shaped US arms sales policy for a very long time, and it doesn’t bend easily.

There’s also a pattern worth remembering: Trump’s big arms-deal announcements don’t always turn into big arms deals. During his first term, he announced a $110 billion weapons package for Saudi Arabia that, in practice, mostly stayed on paper. At the time it was described as more of a declaration than a completed agreement, and American reporting later showed that only a fraction of the announced sums ever translated into actual contracts.

Even if Trump genuinely wants to reward Erdogan politically, the pro-Israel lobby, Congress, the Pentagon, existing legal restrictions, and the push to preserve Israeli military superiority will all slow the process down. That’s why Ankara is far more likely to get its KAAN engines quickly than to get back into the F-35 program at all. One is a relatively easy concession while the other is a legislative and political minefield.

There’s a pattern here that goes beyond Türkiye specifically. Trump has made a habit throughout this term of treating personal rapport as a substitute for policy – floating major concessions in the glow of a good meeting, then watching the machinery of American government slow-walk them into something much smaller. It happened, in part, with Saudi Arabia during his first term. There’s no obvious reason Türkiye would be the exception, especially on an issue as legally and politically loaded as fifth-generation fighter jets. The gap between what Trump says in a room with Erdogan and what actually clears Congress, the Pentagon, and the export-control bureaucracy tends to be wide, and it tends to stay wide for years, not months.

Trump genuinely is warmer toward Erdogan right now than he is toward several of America’s traditional allies, and he genuinely is frustrated with how Israel has handled itself in Lebanon, Gaza, and the broader Iran file. Both of those things are true and worth taking seriously. But US Middle East policy has never run purely on the emotional temperature of one president, and it isn’t about to start now. What’s visible right now is a flirtation between Washington and Ankara – public and strategically useful to both sides. What isn’t visible is any sign that Washington’s long-standing commitment to Israel has been called off. It’s far too early to say America has chosen Türkiye over Israel. Washington is trying, as it often does, to keep both relationships alive at once, extracting what it can from each without formally downgrading either – and the real tension, when it finally surfaces, will show up not in summit speeches or warm handshakes, but in what Congress actually lets through.

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