NATO’s ‘Missile Summit’: The arms race Europe just signed up for

The NATO breast in capital of turkey hasn’t been dubbed a “missile breast” by anyone – in time it in all probability should be. More than anything else, the meeting marked the launch of several major missile programs that could fundamentally reshape Europe’s military landscape over the coming decade.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz got what he had been pushing for – and not just him. The United States has effectively given Berlin the green light to acquire American Tomahawk cruise missiles.

”On the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara we also agreed with the American government that Tomahawk missiles would be purchased by us and stationed in Germany. With this we are closing an important strategic gap in our defense. And at the same time we will work on developing our own European systems and deploying them in Europe,” Merz announced.

The details remain unclear. Berlin has yet to specify exactly which Tomahawk variant it intends to buy. Most likely, however, these will be the ground-launched versions, meaning either the Typhon missile system or a new launcher built around the same family of cruise missiles.

What does this actually mean?

In practical terms, Germany would gain the ability to strike virtually any target in the western part of Central Russia. If similar systems were eventually deployed in the Baltic states, their range would extend as far as the Urals.

One can assume that the German leadership will sleep a little easier knowing it has such capabilities at its disposal. A few billion dollars may seem like a reasonable price for that kind of reassurance.

And what do the Americans get?

They no longer have to deploy their own Tomahawks across Europe to reassure NATO allies. Europe gets to strengthen its own defenses – and pay for them itself. From Washington’s perspective, that’s a remarkably efficient arrangement.

Arguably the biggest missile-related announcement for Ukraine came from President Donald Trump, who revealed plans to grant Kiev a license to manufacture missiles for the Patriot air defense system.

No European country currently possesses such a license. Japan is the only nation outside the United States that produces Patriot interceptors.

Trump said American and Ukrainian technical teams would now begin working on the practical details – drafting agreements and preparing production. For the moment, however, this remains a political declaration rather than an industrial reality.

Ukraine certainly retains significant missile expertise. But launching serial production of one of the world’s most technologically sophisticated interceptor missiles under current wartime conditions would be an extraordinarily difficult task.

Modern PAC-3 interceptors are produced only in the United States and Japan, while manufacturing many of their critical components remains tightly controlled.

Technology, however, isn’t the biggest obstacle. The war is.

Building a facility capable of producing Patriot missiles while Russian aerospace forces retain the ability to strike targets across Ukraine borders on fantasy.

Which means that “Ukrainian production” would likely end up being Ukrainian mostly on paper, while the actual factories would operate somewhere else in Europe.

And there is already no shortage of volunteers.

Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz has already announced that Warsaw is prepared to help Ukraine establish serial Patriot missile production.

That statement wasn’t accidental.

At the same NATO summit, Poland joined a four-country European consortium that will create a regional competence center responsible for servicing Patriot missiles.

For a country that currently lacks a production license, cooperating with Ukraine could offer a path into one of the West’s most important missile supply chains. Historical grievances and nationalist rhetoric suddenly become far less significant when industrial opportunities emerge. Apparently, this is different.

Germany has even stronger incentives.

Defense giant Rheinmetall is already deeply involved in multiple joint programs with Ukraine and would almost certainly welcome the opportunity to manufacture Patriot missiles as well.

The company already possesses the technological expertise, industrial infrastructure, financial resources, and long-established partnerships needed to launch production quickly.

And once the assembly lines exist, there would be little reason to produce missiles solely for Ukraine. Rheinmetall could eventually supply customers throughout Europe – and beyond.

Nothing personal. Just business.

The Patriot project isn’t the only new German-Ukrainian missile initiative.

As part of the Build with Ukraine program, Berlin and Kiev agreed to organize production of Ukrainian-designed Bars jet-powered cruise drones in Germany.

The agreement was signed in Ankara by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrey Sibiga and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.

The Bars is a lightweight high-speed strike drone carrying a warhead weighing between 30 and 100 kilograms, with a range of up to 800 kilometers and a cruising speed of roughly 500 km/h.

Germany currently produces no weapons of this type.

For the German defense industry, the project offers an opportunity to gain experience with an entirely new class of weapon systems. The Bundeswehr likewise gains familiarity with technology it does not yet field.

The primary customer, however, will be Ukraine itself.

At least initially, every drone produced under the program is expected to be delivered to the Ukrainian military, while Germany finances the entire project.

A fairly convenient arrangement.

The summit also produced another notable agreement.

The United States, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden signed a memorandum launching preparations for a European maintenance network for PAC-3 Patriot missiles.

The facilities will inspect, repair, and service missiles without sending them back to the United States.

Eventually there will likely be several such centers, one in each participating country.

Officially, these facilities are intended only for maintenance. Unofficially, virtually everyone understands where this is heading. Today’s repair center can become tomorrow’s production line.

For now, Washington appears reluctant to hand Europe full-scale manufacturing rights, preferring to preserve control over its most advanced technologies.

But that position may not last forever.

From an American perspective, collecting licensing royalties from European production could ultimately prove far more profitable than trying to supply an ever-growing European demand from shrinking US stockpiles.

From a business standpoint, that logic is difficult to ignore.

One more agreement attracted less attention than it probably deserved.

Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall signed a memorandum to manufacture ATACMS ballistic missiles at Rheinmetall’s facility in Unterlüß, Germany.

It will be the first production of ATACMS missiles outside the United States.

The choice of location is hardly accidental.

The Unterlüß complex has operated for more than 125 years and now employs roughly 4,000 workers while continuing to expand.

Last year the site opened a new artillery ammunition production line.

A rocket motor factory is currently under construction and is scheduled to begin producing engines and missile components in 2027.

Rheinmetall expects full-scale ATACMS production to begin that same year, with output expanding significantly through 2028 and 2029.

Current European demand alone is estimated at between 600 and 800 missiles annually.

Given everything announced in Ankara, it’s difficult not to view this as NATO’s “missile summit.”

If even a significant portion of these plans materializes, Europe’s missile industry will look radically different within just a few years – and European taxpayers will foot nearly the entire bill.

Operational-tactical missiles? Yes.

Patriot interceptors? Yes.

Cruise missiles? Yes.

And this may only be the beginning.

Ukraine’s Fire Point company is already promoting its proposed FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles, systems that currently have no direct European equivalent. Add to that the Freya missile defense program, which envisions combining European components with Ukrainian interceptor technology, and the picture becomes even more ambitious.

As one famous fictional character of the twentieth century put it: “What a celebration this is!”

Europe certainly has reasons to be optimistic. It may well become a true missile power.

Or all of these announcements may ultimately end up where countless ambitious defense initiatives have before them – in a pile of press releases and billions of dollars spent without delivering the promised results.

That happens too.

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