Is Trump’s stark new security strategy the end of the liberal world order? Europeans will need convincing

U.S. Chairperson Donald ruff’s young subject certificate strategy appears to blow up some of the key principles behind 80 years of European collective defence, challenging the foundation of the continent’s relationship with the country.

But on whether the White House will — or even can — follow through on many of its more radical or transformative demands, many European capitals will likely need more convincing.

In a blistering attack, Trump’s new policy portrays Europe’s governments as weak and ineffective. Migration has destroyed the continent’s self-confidence, it claims, accusing the European Union of contributing to a loss of national sovereignty, weakened political freedoms and the diminished effectiveness of individual nation states.

Not a word is mentioned of Russia being an adversary — or the instigator of a horrific, ongoing war against its neighbour Ukraine. 

The document does not say the U.S. Core interest should be the defeat of Russia and the return of Ukraine’s territories, but rather that it should seek to restore “strategic stability" with Russia.

In other places, Trump’s strategy reads more as a manifesto for fostering the Make America Great Again movement in Europe and advancing policies of far-right parties such as Germany’s AfD — particularly with regards to the negative impacts of immigration — than it does a traditional blueprint for preserving the shared values of deeply connected allies.  

Indeed, it appears to invert the ally-adversary dynamic by saying it's Europe where the United States should be pushing hard, “cultivating resistance” to its current trajectory, rather than against Russia.

While the document commits the United States to NATO, it appears to view American responsibility for defending Europe as conditional and limited — a seismic change. 

“The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” it states. It portrays the country as more of a mediator when it comes in resolving European conflicts with Russia, rather than the continent's most steadfast backer.

To many European ears, the strategy appears to weaken the core principle of collective defence that underpins NATO — that an attack on one country amounts to attack on all of them. 

Many analysts believe NATO’s Article 5 guarantee has been essential in avoiding a confrontation between members of the alliance and Russia since the end of the Second World War. 

But speaking to the BBC, Trump’s former EU ambassador Gordon Sondland said if European countries want to protect themselves from future aggressions by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the onus should be firmly on them. 

“He [Putin] will try again unless Europe finally steps up and creates a major roadblock for him," said Sondland.

That means defence spending and committing materials and personnel, Sondland said, "to make it clear that Europe is willing to get into that kind of a war with Putin, backed by the United States, but not led by the United States. That's where Trump is going here."

While the strategy’s tone and existential attacks on the European Union are stronger than in the past, the thrust of the document is familiar. 

U.S. Vice-President JD Vance delivered the initial salvo of this so-called “America First” strategy in his infamous speech to the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.

Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of its release by the White House Thursday night, the document was greeted with everything from deep concern to open outrage by European security analysts and some EU leaders. 

“This is Donald Trump drawing a line in the sand — the end of the post-Cold War liberal international order,” said Leslie Vinjamuri of the esteemed London-based think-tank Chatham House, speaking on a podcast. 

There was also indignation that Trump again appeared to be trying to put his finger on the scales of European elections by opposing centrist or pro-EU parties.

António Costa, the Portuguese president of the European Council, said the Trump administration has no right to tell people in Europe who they should vote for. 

“The United States cannot replace European citizens in choosing which are the right parties and which are the wrong parties.”

But as the dust settles, much of that initial harsh response has softened. 

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said some of the strategy was “understandable” and “comprehensible,” while at the same time agreeing that his country — Europe’s biggest defence spender — must be “much more independent from the U.S. In terms of security policy.” 

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, a centrist, came out against the strategy, but still struck a conciliatory tone.

“Dear American friends,” he wrote on X, “Europe is your closest ally, not your problem. And we have common enemies. At least that’s how it has been in the last 80 years. We need to stick to this, this is the only reasonable strategy [for] our common security.”

Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, traditional U.S. Allies, including Canada, have been insulted, tariffed and treated more like adversaries as he's tried to reset the global order to reflect his “America First” priorities.

Europeans have generally held their collective tongues, often resorting to flattery. The U.K. Even threw a lavish state visit to try and keep the unpredictable U.S. Leader onside. 

And while two-thirds of NATO members — again, including Canada — have answered the U.S. Call for more defence spending, EU members have generally demonstrated little interest in following other aspects of Trump’s agenda. 

Aside from Britain, which voted to leave the union in 2016, no other member nation has expressed an interest in exiting the political and economic bloc. Even in countries where Euro-skepticism is higher, such as France and Italy, such sentiments remain in the minority.

European nations may also be keeping their fingers off the panic button because the document omits so many of the direct threats faced by the United States that it's difficult to know how much of a blueprint it really is.

There is little mention of hacking by China. There is no mention of North Korea’s nuclear program and the risk it poses to the U.S. Treaty allies Japan and South Korea. Nor is there reference to competition between superpowers with regards to nuclear weapons — or in space. 

“It's difficult to see the United States surrendering any kind of true global power,” said Brandan Buck with the Cato Institute, a libertarian-minded think tank in Washington, D.C.

Buck says while within the MAGA part of Trump’s base, there may be a push to pull back as far as possible from global entanglements, there remains widespread Republican support for NATO and collective defence, with the United States offering a strong backstop.

“As far as the institutions of the conservative movement, I think there’s a lot of hesitancy to do anything drastic.” 

All of that may give European leaders reason to think they can continue along the path they’ve started with Trump, hoping to either wait him out until the midterm elections or until 2028, when a new U.S. President will be sworn in. 

However, analyst Judy Dempsey, writing for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggested that would be the wrong approach.

Trump's document, she wrote, is correct about many things.

“Europe does lack self-confidence. Yes, it has far too long relied on the United States as a security guarantor. Yes, it has failed to listen to the grievances of the far right.”

But if in the aftermath of Trump’s directives Europe’s leaders are contemplating a dramatic reset, there’s little indication of it yet.

Foreign correspondent

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