Supreme Court raps ‘rich, affluent’ for using writ pleas to dodge PMLA trials

THe sublime margaret court on tues lamented what it described as a growing trend of the “rich and wealthy” coming(a) constitutional courts to challenge the validity of penal laws after they are booked under these.It cautioned that such litigants cannot be permitted to bypass criminal trials by invoking writ jurisdiction.A bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi made the remarks while hearing a writ petition filed by Delhi-based lawyer Gautam Khaitan, who questioned the constitutional validity of Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA essentially provides that once a money-laundering case is taken up by a special court, that court can also try the linked “scheduled offence” along with it, so that both cases proceed together instead of before separate courts.Notably, Khaitan is one of the accused facing PMLA prosecution by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) in connection with the AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter deal. He has also been booked under the the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 , a scheduled offence under the PMLA.“This is a unique trend now. When trial is ongoing, the rich and affluent move court challenging the vires of legislation. Face trial like any other citizen,” CJI Kant remarked during the hearing. The Chief Justice went on to add that such a practice must be discouraged, observing that “these rich applicants think they can bypass any trial”, and emphasising that they must be treated no differently from ordinary accused persons.Senior advocate Sidharth Luthra, appearing for Khaitan, argued that the writ petition raised an important constitutional question concerning the validity of Section 44(1)(c) of the PMLA, which governs the trial of scheduled offences and money laundering offences by special courts. However, the bench was unconvinced that a separate writ petition was warranted at this stage.In its order, the court noted that the legality of key provisions of the PMLA, including those governing trial and procedure, is already under consideration in a batch of review petitions arising from its landmark 2022 judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Vs Union of India. In that ruling, the Supreme Court had upheld the core framework of the PMLA, including the ED’s powers to arrest, conduct searches, attach property, and record statements.“Since the issue of the eligibility of provisions of PMLA is under consideration in certain review petitions filed in the Vijay Madanlal case, it seems to us that the legality of Section 44(1)(c) shall be examined in the course of that,” said the bench, declining to entertain Khaitan’s writ petition. The court accordingly dismissed the plea, while clarifying that the question of law was being kept open.When Luthra sought liberty to raise the issue independently if Section 44(1)(c) was not specifically argued in the pending matters, the CJI responded by granting liberty not to the petitioner but to the senior counsel, indicating that the issue could be addressed when the larger batch is taken up. The bench also noted that it expects to commence hearing the remaining PMLA matters by the end of January.The present order comes against the backdrop of sustained legal scrutiny of the Supreme Court’s 2022 Vijay Madanlal Choudhary verdict. A bench led by CJI Kant is currently seized of a batch of petitions seeking review of that judgment, which upheld several controversial features of the PMLA. On July 31, a bench comprising justices Kant, Ujjal Bhuyan and N Kotiswar Singh had made it clear that it would first examine the maintainability of the review petitions, underscoring that the court’s review jurisdiction operates within narrow and well-defined parameters.The petitioners in the pending batch have raised a wide-ranging challenge to the 2022 ruling, flagging at least 13 issues for reconsideration. These include arguments that the judgment diluted the offence of money laundering by misinterpreting statutory provisions, retrospectively applied the law in violation of fundamental rights, and wrongly upheld the ED’s power to compel statements under Section 50 of the PMLA, allegedly undermining the constitutional protection against self-incrimination.The petitioners have also questioned the court’s earlier conclusions that ED officers are not “police officers”, the non-supply of the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) to accused persons, and the constitutionality of the reverse burden of proof and stringent bail conditions under the PMLA, which they argue strip accused persons of basic due process safeguards.