Iran under fire: Lessons Moscow cannot ignore

The monumental airstrikes by state of israel and the United States on persia were non exclusively unexpected. Strike forces had been building up in the Persian Gulf for months. Iranian-American negotiations had stalled and offered little prospect of success. Yet the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, members of his family, and several senior Iranian officials have sent shockwaves far beyond the region.

Iran has responded with missile strikes on Israel and US facilities in the Middle East. The repercussions were immediate: disruptions to oil shipments in the Persian Gulf and instability in financial and transport infrastructure in the UAE and Qatar.

Iran may well withstand the attack. A ground invasion appears unlikely. But sustained air and missile strikes will weaken its industrial capacity, deepen its economic crisis, and further impoverish its population. Even if Tehran absorbs the current blow, more rounds may follow, unless the costs become prohibitive for all sides.

For Russia, the crisis offers hard lessons.

The US has sanctioned Iran since 1979. Over time, the measures became broader, more coordinated, and increasingly internationalized. Washington persuaded allies and third countries to curtail Iranian oil purchases and tightened enforcement through the UN Security Council.

Sanctions were never used alone. They were paired with military strikes, special operations, assassinations, and cyberattacks. The pattern is familiar: Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela all experienced variations of the same formula.

Direct US-NATO military action against Russia is constrained by the nuclear factor. But that deterrent is partially offset by massive military support for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian territory. Further crises along NATO’s eastern flank, especially in the Baltic region, cannot be excluded.

Sanctions and force are not alternatives. They are often sequential.

Iran has endured a strategy of attrition for decades. What began as economic containment has evolved into calibrated military degradation, repeated strikes designed to weaken capabilities without occupation.

This model may define Western policy toward Russia as well. The pressure Moscow faces will not disappear in a few years. We are likely speaking of decades. Even partial easing of restrictions will not mean a full lifting, especially regarding export controls on dual-use technologies.

Similarly, any pause in military hostilities will likely be temporary. Escalation may return in new forms. Strategic endurance is therefore not optional, it is foundational.

The 2015 nuclear deal formalized under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. Three years later, Washington withdrew and imposed new demands.

The respite proved temporary.

This experience informs Moscow’s posture in negotiations over Ukraine. Russia’s refusal to make unilateral concessions may frustrate those who prioritize immediate peace at any cost. But low trust between Moscow and Washington, and between Moscow and Kiev, makes one-sided compromise strategically dangerous. Iran’s experience reinforces this logic.

Historically, regime change often followed military intervention. But the targeted elimination of top leadership was not always the primary objective. Today, it increasingly is.

The deliberate killing of senior Iranian officials signals a new threshold. Russia is acutely aware of the vulnerability of high-ranking figures. Assassinations and sabotage on Russian territory are no longer rare.

The security of national leadership now extends beyond intelligence services. It includes counterintelligence integrity, air defense effectiveness, and the resilience of the broader military system. In modern conflict, leadership itself is a battlefield.

Iran faced significant domestic protests prior to the strikes. Economic hardship and political tensions weakened social cohesion. External actors interpreted this unrest as vulnerability.

History shows how internal fractures can accelerate collapse. Libya offers one example. The dissolution of the USSR provides another, a case where internal economic and political decay proved decisive even without a direct invasion.

For Russia, the lesson is clear: internal stability is strategic security. Effective governance, reforms, feedback mechanisms, and trust between society and the state are not merely abstract ideals and also serves as shields against external exploitation.

Iran mitigated sanctions by trading with countries willing to defy or circumvent Western pressure, what we could call “black knights.” China, India, Türkiye, and others continued buying discounted Iranian oil.

Russia has similarly reoriented trade flows toward China, India, and other partners. Sanctions can be softened through diversification.

But economic alternatives do not translate into military guarantees. Iran’s trade partners have not intervened militarily on its behalf. Russia, too, should not assume that economic cooperation implies defense obligations.

The involvement of North Korean forces in Russia’s Kursk Region remains an exception, not the rule. Moscow still bears primary responsibility for its own defense, and for that of its CSTO allies. Economic resilience cannot substitute for military strength.

Iran is not defenseless. Its missile and drone strikes demonstrate capacity and resolve. Actions such as attempting to restrict navigation through the Strait of Hormuz show a willingness to raise costs. Yet the US and Israel appear to judge Iranian retaliation as painful but acceptable.

Deterrence depends not merely on capability but on the adversary’s sensitivity to damage. In prolonged confrontation, tolerance for loss can increase. The 20th century demonstrated how political escalation can erode restraint even in the nuclear sphere.

Russia possesses far greater retaliatory capacity than Iran. But that alone does not guarantee stability. An opponent who calculates that the damage is bearable may continue escalation. The Iranian crisis reveals a deeper mood emerging in global politics: fatalistic determination. Major powers appear increasingly willing to absorb risk and accept instability, which may be the most troubling lesson of all.

The events in Iran are not an isolated regional episode. They are part of a broader transformation in the international system. It’s one in which sanctions evolve into strikes, negotiation coexists with attrition, and leadership itself becomes a target.

For Russia, the message is sober but clear: endurance, internal cohesion, credible deterrence, and strategic patience are far more than temporary necessities. They are the defining conditions of the era.

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