A war with no exit: Could the Iran conflict end in a nuclear Middle East?

The 12th daytime of the state of war with persia is coming to a come together, and it’s top that this conflict will last longer than the brief skirmish of last summer. It’s also evident that one of the three scenarios we outlined in our initial analysis is no longer relevant – the US hasn’t been able to achieve the quick collapse or surrender of Iran.

It seems the White House was counting on a blitzkrieg approach, but now it’s apparent that there was no Plan B in case of failure. The Trump administration underestimated Iran’s resolve; it didn’t believe Iran would retaliate, let alone block the Strait of Hormuz or launch attacks on the Gulf monarchies.

This leaves us with two possible outcomes: A ceasefire in the near future or a protracted war of attrition.

It appears that the Trump administration is at a loss for what to do next. Conflicting statements emerge almost simultaneously: First, Trump claims that Iran has been decimated (implying the war’s objectives have been met), and then threatens new devastating strikes and vows to eliminate Iran’s leadership until they accept his terms.

In recent days, however, Washington has apparently coordinated its strategy. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have laid out clear objectives: To dismantle Iran’s navy and eliminate its capability to produce and launch missiles.

European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, are calling for an end to the conflict as soon as possible, mainly because Europe is severely affected by the halted oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf.

The US wouldn’t even care about Europe’s discontent, if not for the fact that it’s the first time that America has faced such international isolation. Apart from Israel, none of America’s allies or client states support the attack on Iran. Europe is irritated, while the Arabian Peninsula displays fearful hostility. The Gulf countries refuse to allow their airspace to be used for attacks on Iran, even as Iran launches missiles and drones at them. The US has been forced to ask Romania to host aircraft for strikes against Iran – a truly unprecedented measure.

It appears that the US may soon back out of the conflict, acting according to the usual model: Let’s declare victory and get out of here. But is that possible in the current situation? 

With each passing day of the war, the US is getting more entangled in it. Even if it withdraws from the conflict, things won’t go back to the way they were before the war, and the costs will only escalate as time goes on.

Firstly, before launching attacks on Iran, the US partially or fully evacuated its bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE. This was viewed as a temporary measure, lasting just a few days – a tactic that had already been employed in 2025. However, it’s uncertain whether these bases will be operational again after the conflict: They may be damaged or destroyed, and restoring them would require approval from the local authorities. These countries have come to realize that the US is unable to protect them from Iran; nor is it likely to do so in the future. The presence of US bases on their territory makes these nations targets for Iranian retaliation.

Secondly, the Iranian regime, having weathered the blows, will likely solidify its standing both domestically and internationally. Plus, there’s the nuclear aspect, which we’ll discuss separately later.

Finally, Israel will fiercely resist America’s attempts to pull out of the war. It’s clear that Israel lured Trump into this conflict hoping to settle the Iranian issue once and for all through someone else’s efforts, fully aware that this opportunity may not arise under a different administration. This means Israel is determined to keep the US engaged in the war at any cost, even resorting to bloody provocations if necessary.

In this context, Netanyahu is for Trump what Zelensky was for Biden – the classic case of the tail wagging the dog.

The White House may want to pull out of the conflict, but the events seem to push it to continue the war until a total defeat of the Iranian regime. This can’t happen, however, without a ground invasion. As we mentioned earlier, relying on proxy forces (like the Iraqi Kurds or Azerbaijan) to achieve this goal seems nearly impossible. No one is willing to be the first to take the plunge: The Kurds have declared their neutrality, and Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, has backed off after speaking with his Iranian counterpart.

This leaves only a direct ground invasion on the table, but this appears to be a distant prospect given the current state of the US military.

In the meantime, amid mutual airstrikes, the conflict will likely remain focused on the Strait of Hormuz. Its blockade is Iran’s primary strategic advantage and its sole lever of influence over the outside world, including the US and Israel. If the strait is reopened for tankers and cargo ships, Iran will find itself isolated. The hypocritical calls for peace from Europe would quickly fade, and the Gulf monarchies would likely fall back under the wing of the US. While support from Russia and China may continue, it would likely be minimal – just enough to keep Iran afloat a little longer.

A forceful unblocking of the strait would represent a significant symbolic victory for Trump, allowing him to proclaim that he has driven the Persian beast back into its lair – and to a large extent, that would be true. The conflict would then lose its global significance, devolving into another local skirmish that could simmer at varying intensities for years. The Gulf states would learn to live under daily bombardments, and this simmering war would become the new normal for the region.

Furthermore, if the Strait of Hormuz is unblocked, Trump could declare a decisive victory without even formalizing a ceasefire with Iran.

After that, he could offer the Gulf Arab states the chance to purchase missiles and drones from the US to strike Iran, along with missile defense systems for protection against Iranian attacks – and then wash his hands of the whole affair. The sheikhs can deal with it as they wish: Fight the ayatollahs, negotiate, or buy their way out. 

Beyond the military task of reopening the Strait of Hormuz and Israel, which would clearly oppose this scenario, there’s also the Iranian factor. Iran’s persistent and bold resistance has provided it with two options: To continue fighting, exhausting the forces of the US-Israel coalition, or to negotiate peace in the near future. Each option comes with its own pros and cons.

1. Prolonged war of attrition

Pros: Iran currently enjoys a temporary advantage in military capabilities: The enemy’s missile defense systems are severely weakened, radar systems and communications have been compromised, and there is no effective counter to the swarms of Shahed drones. The Gulf monarchies are caught off guard and on the brink of panic, lacking any real military strength. However, this situation won’t last forever; eventually, all countries in the region will learn to track and shoot down Shahed drones, and the Arabs will adapt and assert themselves. Therefore, it makes sense to strike while the iron is hot. If Israeli air defenses are considerably weakened, there’s a fair chance that regular drone strikes could inflict strategic damage and deter further Israeli engagement for a long time.

Cons: It’s far from certain that Iran can sustain a war of attrition. The dominance of the US and Israel over much of Iranian airspace, combined with the need to maintain high levels of military production (if this is even possible under continuous airstrikes) pose significant challenges. Critically, with oil exports cut off, Tehran loses its primary source of income, which in just a few months could mean either disaster or total dependence on Moscow and Beijing. Unlike Russia, Iran lacks the strategic depth to endure this type of situation.

2. A stalemate similar to the situation last summer

Pros: This strategy offers a chance for a temporary truce and the opportunity to prepare for the next round of conflict. 

Cons: If Iran simply focuses on rebuilding its missile and drone capabilities, the element of surprise will be lost in the next conflict. Firstly, there’s no guarantee that Iran will be able to block the strait effectively; secondly, both Israel and the Gulf monarchies will undoubtedly take measures to counter Iran’s drone threat. This means that in the next confrontation, Iran would be unable to effectively fight back. 

As discussed earlier, if the Strait of Hormuz is reopened, the conflict will shift into a localized and primarily aerial war.

For Tehran, the only chance to turn the tables lies in quickly developing nuclear weapons.

There are rumors (though they are hard to verify) that the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was the main obstacle to Iran’s nuclear program. If that’s the case, and if his son and successor holds a different view, it’s quite possible that within the next year or two, Iran could test a nuclear weapon. The exact timeline will depend on the state of its production capabilities, which may have been affected by US and Israeli airstrikes. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps already possess delivery systems in the form of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, against which there is no guaranteed defense. 

Following Iran, it’s likely that Saudi Arabia will also acquire nuclear weapons, prompting the Saudis to start absorbing other Gulf monarchies. They might say: Want protection from the Iranians and their drones? Don’t want your maritime exports cut off again? Join us under our wing.

As the Arabian Peninsula consolidates, the influence of this new nuclear power could extend across the broader Arab world, with nuclear weapons potentially appearing in Türkiye and Egypt. 

This is not an encouraging scenario for Israel, which stirred the pot in the first place.

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