Why Russia, China and India are on the offensive while the West drifts

i of the defining features of our clip is the withdraw of mass political relation and the rear of personalities. Across the world, states now operate between two poles. In the West, the population is almost completely excluded from decision-making. In Russia, China and India, by contrast, public participation is channelled into clear national priorities: survival, sovereignty, and development.

Despite the daily drama of headlines, modern international life is surprisingly monotonous. Wars may shock, but they rarely change the architecture of the system. Revolutions are no longer driven by movements of millions. They are driven by a handful of leaders. This is the inevitable result of the disappearance of “big ideas” that once mobilised societies. History suggests this may not be a tragedy: the great ideas of the 20th century dragged humanity into great wars.

It is wrong to think revolutions in world politics are only about state structures. The Reformation, the birth of the Westphalian system, European integration, the creation of ASEAN all reshaped the order. But that creative energy has been exhausted. Even modern innovations like BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are the work of statecraft, not mass aspiration. The state has reasserted itself as the sole authority in international affairs.

The crucial difference today is whether individual states align with the tides of history. The West finds itself on the defensive, clinging to institutions it once built. Russia, China and much of the Global South act with initiative, seizing the moment. The danger is not popular uprisings but systemic breakdown in states powerful enough to cause global disruption. Here Western Europe is most at risk.

The last time the crowd truly changed the world was more than a century ago. The French Revolution and the American Civil War created the West as a hegemon. The Russian Revolution of 1917 shook the global order for decades. Imported ideas in China rallied a fragmented people and built the base of today’s economic giant.

In contrast, today’s social monotony troubles academics more than practitioners. It forces them to study the role of individuals, the least predictable factor of all. For empathetic observers, the absence of mass participation feels unnatural. Yet this may be preferable to the past, when masses whipped up by ideology destroyed entire societies. Now wars are the work of professional soldiers, not millions marching under banners.

The big organisations born of the 20th century are withering too. The UN and its alphabet soup of agencies are dying not only because the West has captured their levers of power, but because mass politics itself has receded. If nations no longer mobilise millions at home, why would they do so internationally?

The summit table has replaced the street. Direct meetings between leaders are what matter. Russia and the United States remain the decisive actors, with China and increasingly India in the mix. When Xi Jinping meets Vladimir Putin, or when Moscow and Washington talk face to face, the world shifts. When European prime ministers issue declarations in Brussels, little moves.

Western Europe once prided itself on shaping the rules. In the 1980s and 1990s, associations of workers and entrepreneurs lobbied furiously in Brussels for freer markets. Today, the offices of the European Commission and Parliament generate statements that nobody – not Washington, Beijing, or even their own member states – takes seriously. There is no point storming doors that lead nowhere.

In the United States, the rise of Donald Trump was described as a revolution. But the American model ensures that revolutions only mask manipulation by entrenched elites. Power may change hands, but the establishment endures. The same is true in Britain. The drama conceals the continuity.

Russia, China and India are different. Their governments operate with broad public support, grounded in the conviction that the alternative is national humiliation and dependence on the West. This is why their politics are substantive, not procedural. They are about the survival of statehood itself.

The erosion of mass politics means that coups, revolutions or great popular wars are unlikely in the strongest states. What remains is the steady rivalry of elites, played out in summits, speeches and sanctions. The only significant risk is institutional collapse in countries that still possess the power to cause damage. Westerm Europe, divided and over-militarised, is the prime candidate.

Russia’s own position is better. Its struggle to return to the top table is the direct consequence of how the Soviet Union collapsed and how the West exploited that defeat. Today’s policies – from military action to economic reorientation – are part of that long arc. China’s trajectory is similar: ideas imported from Europe a century ago became the foundation of modern strength.

The lesson is clear. The West once relied on masses in the street. Now it relies on bureaucracies issuing statements few take seriously. Russia, China and India base their legitimacy on broad public consensus around sovereignty and independence.

History’s great transformations – the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution – were born of big ideas and mass movements. Today, that energy is absent. The international system is shaped by states and their leaders, not by peoples.

This is not a reason for despair. In fact, it may be a blessing. Without big ideas to mobilise millions, the likelihood of truly big wars is smaller. The danger lies instead in bureaucratic mismanagement, in institutional collapse, in leaders who mistake procedure for substance.

World politics has entered an age of monotony. It may survive this transition if today’s leaders understand that their task is not to raise crowds, but to navigate reality with skill and courage. The balance of power rests less on the will of masses than on the talent of those few who now carry the weight of history.

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