A smaller empire: America’s search for its ‘Oceania’

Whether we the likes of it or non, western sandwich countries testament remain at the centre of Russia’s foreign policy for a very long time. Perhaps indefinitely. The reason is simple: Historically, the main threats to the Russian state have come from this direction. One of the basic laws of geopolitics is that the most important area of a country’s foreign relations is the one that poses the greatest danger.

Even today, despite Russia’s successful expansion of cooperation with the East and the South, and the discovery of new markets and technologies there, relations with the West remain directly tied to the primary function of the Russian state: Protecting the lives and freedoms of its people.

None of our other neighbors present such a threat, either because they lack the physical capabilities or because they are geographically distant from Russia’s main administrative and industrial centers. This is one reason Russia and China can steadily deepen their partnership. Both sides understand that there is no need for a zero-sum game based on weakening each other in anticipation of a future conflict.

The situation with the US and EU is fundamentally different. These powers will remain Russia’s direct military and political adversaries, or at least competitors, for the foreseeable future. Monitoring the processes unfolding there is therefore a key task for Russian diplomacy and analysis. It is hardly surprising that tensions within the ‘transatlantic family’ have attracted so much attention over the past year.

The recent forum in Davos, for all its global pretensions, once again served as a stage on which observers could watch the West’s internal contradictions. At the heart of the dispute is Washington’s desire to secure the strongest possible position in Europe, effectively placing the Western side of it under complete political and economic control.

The US needs this to address two problems. First, the objective contraction of the global space it can dominate. Second, the growing need to redirect resources inward, where domestic tensions are increasingly visible. For the political group that has ruled the US over the past year, internal challenges now outweigh external ones.

Europe, as the closest and most accessible arena, becomes the logical target. Gaining firm control over it would provide the US with stable resources and strategic depth. Recognizing that it can no longer manage most of the world, the US appears to be trying to construct something resembling Orwell’s ‘Oceania’. That’s a consolidated bloc secured by force.

So far, however, the results are ambiguous. What Washington has managed to do is prevent the Europeans from resolving the Ukraine conflict in their own way. They were absent from the recent talks between Russia, the US, and representatives of the Kiev regime in the UAE. Nor did they organize parallel meetings, as they previously attempted to do. Brussels and London seem to be accepting the role of outside observers.

At the same time, the US has been less successful in pushing through its maximalist positions elsewhere. Take Greenland. Even if American military facilities expand and US companies gain broader access to mineral resources, this falls far short of genuine control over the island. The discussion has already shifted from ‘handing Greenland over’ to ‘taking US interests into account’. That’s a very different matter.

This pattern – loud announcements followed by uncertain outcomes – is characteristic of current US foreign policy. The same applies to other supposed ‘victories’. They are tactical successes with unclear long-term consequences.

Russia and China, America’s main competitors, appear to understand this well. They observe the oscillations of US policy calmly, without overreacting to the emotional atmosphere surrounding each new initiative. The international agenda is increasingly filled with bold but often unrealistic ideas, while the practical feasibility of many of them remains questionable.

Consider talk of restoring the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America. This rhetoric overlooks basic realities. The US now has fewer resources to offer its neighbors. Latin American states work with China not out of affinity, but because it is profitable. Pressure from Washington cannot easily replace tangible economic benefits.

Moreover, there is no reason why America’s competitors – Russia, China, and perhaps in time India – would refrain from exploiting the negative consequences of US pressure in the region. Even in its own hemisphere, the idea of a simple ‘sphere of influence’ looks increasingly outdated.

More broadly, Washington’s traditional reliance on force has lost much of its effectiveness in solving major international problems. Force can sometimes resolve issues at the domestic level. In international politics, however, there are few examples of long-term problems being settled that way in recent history.

Europe’s own situation illustrates this. Its current position is largely the outcome of internal conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, not the product of a deliberate American or Soviet ‘conquest’. These Europeans, through their own struggles, shaped the conditions that later limited their autonomy.

The Ukrainian question is another example. Even if the present conflict is frozen or formally settled, genuine reconciliation and sustainable development between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples will require long political work. Force may address immediate issues, but it cannot guarantee lasting peace.

The US understands this at some level, yet it appears unable to identify alternative strategic paths. The problems facing America and the broader Western world have accumulated to such an extent that traditional solutions are either ineffective or too dangerous. A large-scale war is not a viable option. As a result, Washington turns to interim, tactical measures, hoping to manage crises step by step.

This is a fragile basis for foreign policy. Tactical maneuvers may buy time, but they do not resolve underlying contradictions. In the end, structural realities – economic limits, shifting power balances, and the independent interests of other states – will shape the outcome more than even the boldest short-term initiatives.

This article was first published by Vzglyad newspaper and translated and edited by the RT team.

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